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Abstract
We study Switzerland’s 1990s growth weakness through the lens of the business
cycle accounting framework by Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007). Our main
result is that weak productivity growth cannot account for the experienced
stagnation. Rather, the stagnation is explained by factors that made labor
and investment expensive. We show that an increase in labor income taxes
and financial frictions are plausible causes. Holding these factors constant,
counterfactual real annualized output growth over the 1992Q1–1996Q4 period is
1.93%, compared to a realized growth of 0.35%.
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1 Introduction
The development of the Swiss economy in the 1990s differs quite substantially from the
experiences of other industrialized countries, including its neighboring countries. While
many countries experienced a recession at the beginning of the 1990s, what is different for
Switzerland is that it remained in a prolonged stagnation, lasting until 1997 (see Figure 1).
Annual real growth averaged roughly 1% throughout the decade—placing Switzerland second-
to-last among all OECD countries. In per-capita terms, the picture is even bleaker, with
average real annual growth rates of roughly 0.3%.1
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Figure 1: Real GDP per capita (1991Q1 = 100)
Source: OECD Quarterly National Accounts
Different conjectures about the causes of the 1990s stagnation exist, mainly discussed within
the Swiss public and policy debate. At the time, much of the policy discussion focused on
productivity stagnation, associated with structural rigidities such as the lack of competition
in the domestic market. Other (somewhat more modern) explanations point to problems
with financial intermediation in the aftermath of the Swiss housing market collapse around
1990; a depression in exports caused by an expensive Swiss franc; or an increase in payroll
taxes and unemployment benefits acting as a work discouragement.2
Our goal is to quantitatively explore these different narratives of the 1990s stagnation
from a neoclassical perspective. In particular, we apply the business cycle accounting (BCA)
methodology introduced by Chari et al. (2007) and further explained in Brinca, Chari,
Kehoe, and McGrattan (2016) to examine the cyclical episode from 1987Q1 to 1997Q4. Our
analysis is based on a canonical real business cycle (RBC) model calibrated to data over
the 1980Q1–2016Q3 period. Based on this model, the BCA methodology is applied: First,
we estimate the deviations from our model’s optimality conditions—so-called wedges—that
are necessary for the calibrated model to exactly fit the data. As in Chari et al. (2007),
we view these wedges as informative about the underlying frictions needed to understand
particular episodes. Second, we decompose the movement of observed output, investment,
and total hours worked into the obtained wedges. Third, we compare the quantitative results
to the common narratives of the episode. In particular, we use theoretical mappings of the
1Although an important issue, data mismeasurement (e.g. due to underestimated services and terms of
trade improvements) cannot account for the weak growth. According to estimates by Kohli (2004), growth in
the 1990–1996 episode is underestimated by roughly 0.4%-points a year.
2See for instance Dreher and Sturm (2005), Ettlin and Gaillard (2001), or Kleinewefers Lehner (2007).
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wedges to different underlying frictions—so-called equivalence results—to explore different
conjectures about the causes of the 1990s stagnation.
To our knowledge, this study is the first to assess the different narratives of the 1990s
stagnation using economic models. There are a number of papers that look at the Swiss 1990s
episode within the context of the long-term growth weakness between 1970 and 2000. Most
prominently, Kehoe and Prescott (2002) and Kehoe and Ruhl (2003, 2005) apply growth
accounting to decompose Swiss output growth into three factors, namely labor input, capital
input, and the efficiency with which labor and capital are used.3 They identify productivity
as a crucial determinant of the growth weakness. The main difference of our paper to their
work is our narrow focus on the 1990s stagnation, which brings our attention to shorter-term
factors, as opposed to trend growth. The 1987–1997 episode is characterized by the build-up
and burst of a housing bubble, with losses in the domestic lending business comparable in
size to those of the US in the 2007 crisis.4 So far, financial factors have not received much
attention in the analysis of the 1990s stagnation. Our framework is particularly useful in this
respect, as it serves as an organizing device that allows to simultaneously assess different
short- to medium-run channels through which output, investment, and aggregate hours have
been depressed.
Our analysis is also closely related to a vast literature applying BCA to different countries—
including to Switzerland itself. Of particular interest is Adamek (2011), who uses BCA to
look at the Swiss 1990s stagnation. Brinca et al. (2016) contain quantitative BCA results for
Switzerland in their Appendix (without discussion thereof). A main difference to both papers
is our focus on exploring the different conjectures about the causes of the 1990s stagnation.
Also, by using new data, our results differ fundamentally from theirs. Data is a critical issue
in any analysis of Switzerland. For instance, Siegenthaler (2015) shows that the OECD hours
data applied in both Adamek (2011) and Brinca et al. (2016) suffers from severe conceptual
shortcomings prior to 1991. As explained in more detail in the data section, we use a SNB
constructed quarterly hours series that addresses these concerns.
Overall, the results of our analysis can be summarized as follows. In contrast to the
dominant view, we find that a slowdown in productivity growth cannot account for the
stagnation. We also find no evidence that a depression in net exports represented an
important deterrence to growth. From the perspective of the aggregate data as reflected
in the neoclassical growth model, the stagnation is explained by factors that made labor
and investment more expensive. Looking for plausible causes, we find that in our episode of
interest, roughly 50% of the labor wedge deterioration can be explained by an increase in
labor income taxes, while the investment wedge deterioration can be fully explained by an
increase in financial frictions. The effects on growth are sizable: Excluding the measured
3The authors argue that the Swiss experience over the 1970–2000 qualifies as a “Great Depression”. As
pointed out by Siegenthaler (2015), this dubbing provoked quite a controversy, as it contrasts the public
perception of a prosperous and stable economy (see e.g. Abrahamsen et al. (2005)).
4More precisely, write-offs have been estimated to 42 billion Swiss Francs, which is over 10% of Swiss
GDP of the year 1996. At the end of the 1980s, Switzerland experienced a construction boom that took a
sharp turn with the tightening of monetary policy in 1990. The subsequent recession led until 1996 to the
closing of roughly one-third of the 625 banks registered in 1990, as described in the 1997 annual report by
the Swiss Federal Banking Commission (today FINMA).
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increase in labor income taxes and financial frictions, we estimate a counterfactual real
annual output growth of 1.93% for the years 1992–1996, compared to the observed annual
growth of 0.35%.
The remainder is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce the prototype
model, discuss the data and present the measurement and accounting methodology. Section 3
presents the results. In particular, Section 3.3 combines our BCA results with further
evidence to assess the different narratives of the episode.
2 Decomposition methodology
In this section, we first introduce the neoclassical business cycle model that we use as our
lens to analyze the Swiss data. We then describe the estimation and accounting procedures
with which we assess the importance of the different wedges for business cycle movements.
2.1 Model environment
Our model environment is the same as in Chari et al. (2007). It is populated by two
actors, households and firms. Given an initial per capita capital stock k̈0, the representative
household chooses per capita consumption c̈t, per capita investment ẍt, and per capita hours
worked lt to maximize life-time utility
∞∑
t=0
βtE0
{[
log c̈t −ψ
l1+νt
1 + ν
]
Pt
}
,
subject to the per capita budget constraint and law of motion of capital
c̈t + ẍt ≤ ẅtlt + rtk̈t + Ω̈t,
Pt+1k̈t+1 =
[
(1− δ)k̈t + ẍt
]
Pt.
In the above, ẅt denotes the wage rate, rt the rental rate on capital, Ω̈t denotes per capita
lump-sum transfers, and Pt = (1 + γn)tP0 denotes population, assumed to grow at the
deterministic growth rate γn. The use of a trema (e.g. ẅt or k̈t) indicates that a variable is
growing at the rate of labor-augmenting technology along the balanced growth path. The
use of lower-case letters denotes per-capita variables, e.g. Ptk̈t = K̈t or Ptlt = Lt. The
parameters β, ν,ψ, and δ denote the households discount rate of future utility, the inverse
Frisch elasticity of labor supply, a preference parameter for leisure, and the depreciation rate
of capital. Optimal behavior of the representative household leads to
ψlνt c̈t = ẅt, (2.1)
1
c̈t
= βEt
[
1
c̈t+1
(rt+1 + 1− δ)
]
. (2.2)
Equation (2.1) reflects the optimal labor supply schedule of the household. It states that
in optimum, the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between consumption and leisure is
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equal to the real wage. Equation (2.2) is the standard Euler equation describing the optimal
consumption versus savings decision.
As to the firm-side, the representative firm is assumed to rent capital and labor from
perfectly competitive markets to maximize profits subject to a Cobb-Douglas production
function,
max
Lt, K̈t
Ÿt − ẅtLt − rtK̈t,
s.t. Ÿt = K̈αt (ZtLt)1−α,
where Ÿt denotes aggregate production. We assume that labor-augmenting technology
Zt = (1 + γz)tZ0 follows a deterministic process and grows at rate γz. Profit maximization
implies that the rental rates equal the respective marginal products:
rt = α
Ÿt
K̈t
,
ẅt = (1− α)
Ÿt
Lt
.
Finally, market clearing implies that
Pt(c̈t + ẍt) = Ptÿt.
To obtain a stationary model, we detrend all variables that grow on the balanced growth
path by the labor-augmenting technology. Below, letters without trema are used to denote
detrended variables (e.g. ct = c̈t/(1 + γz)t). Overall, the equilibrium of our prototype
economy is summarized by the following system of equations:
yt = k
α
t l
1−α
t , (2.3)
ψ (lt)
ν = (1− α)yt/ct
lt
, (2.4)
1
ct
= β(1 + γz)Et
[
1
ct+1
(
α
yt+1
kt+1
+ (1− δ)
)]
, (2.5)
ct + xt = yt, (2.6)
(1 + γn)(1 + γz)kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + xt. (2.7)
2.2 Prototype
In the data, equilibrium conditions (2.3)–(2.6) do in general not hold exactly. The difference
between the data and the equilibrium conditions gives rise to four deviations, which we refer
to as wedges: time-varying productivity At (using the terminology of Chari et al. (2007),
we refer to it as an efficiency wedge), time-varying taxes on labor income (1− τl,t) (labor
wedge), time-varying taxes on investment (1 + τx,t) (investment wedge), and government
expenditures gt (government wedge). Introducing these four wedges, we rewrite conditions
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(2.3)–(2.6) as:5,6
yt = Atkαt l1−αt , (2.8)
ψlνt = (1 − τl,t)(1− α)
yt/ct
lt
, (2.9)
1
ct
=
1
(1 + τx,t)
β(1 + γz)Et
[
1
ct+1
(
α
yt+1
kt+1
+ (1 + τx,t+1)(1− δ)
)]
, (2.10)
ct + xt + gt = yt. (2.11)
Note that there are in principle different ways to enter the wedges into equilibrium conditions
(2.3)–(2.6). In the above, the way the labor wedge enters the household time allocation
decision (2.9) is equivalent to a tax on labor income, so we write it as (1− τl,t). For the
consumption/investment allocation decision in (2.10), we follow Chari et al. (2007) and
enter the wedge as an implicit investment tax, which is useful as it makes it particularly
easy to interpret the sign. It also needs to be stressed that at a mechanical level, the
recovered wedges represent deviations of the model’s equilibrium equations to the data.
For instance, equation (2.8) implies that all deviations between observed production and
implied production (by the Cobb-Douglas function) are translated into movements in the
efficiency wedge. Similarly, equation (2.9) states that deviations between (1) the MRS
between consumption and leisure and (2) the marginal product of labor are translated into
the labor wedge. As to equations (2.10) and (2.11), they state that the investment wedge
captures deviations from the optimal saving-consumption decision and that the implicit
government expenditures gt captures differences between the supply of goods and the demand
for consumption and investment goods. Yet, it is not this mechanical interpretation of wedges
we are ultimately after. Rather, our interest lies in the underlying frictions that are captured
by the various wedges. We will further expand on this point in Section 3.3, when explaining
how we use the equivalence result by Chari et al. (2007) to link the wedges to candidate
explanations of the 1990s recession and assess their plausibility.
2.3 Estimation methodology
2.3.1 Data
Measuring the specified 4 wedges requires data on four series: output, consumption, invest-
ment, and total hours (the latter consisting of hours per employee times the employment
rate). The analysis is conducted at the quarterly frequency, and the overall period considered
is 1980Q1–2016Q3.
Data on output, consumption, and investment is obtained from the Swiss State Secretariat
for Economic Affairs (SECO). For our purposes, investment corresponds to gross fixed capital
formation and consumption corresponds to private final consumption expenditures.7 To
5No wedge enters equation (2.7), as we use the equation as an identity to recover a capital stock series
based on the observed measures of xt (for a given k0).
6We assume that per capita government expenditures follow the same trend as per capita consumption,
investment, and production.
7In their analysis of Switzerland, Chari et al. (2007) and Brinca et al. (2016) use gross capital formation
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Figure 2: Model-consistent data (1980Q1–2016Q3)
ensure the consistency of the data with the structure of our model economy, we make
two adjustments. First, since our model does not contain consumption taxes, output and
consumption are adjusted for sales taxes. Second, the nominal measures of GDP and its
components are expressed in per capita terms using population aged 16 to 64 and deflated by
both, the implicit GDP price deflator and constant labor augmenting technological progress.
The rate of constant labor augmenting technological progress is obtained by estimating a
linear least-squares trend. We define government consumption gt as the difference between
our adjusted measures of output, consumption, and investment. As we work in a closed
economy model, gt includes net exports. Overall, the data processing closely follows Brinca
et al. (2016), with a few adjustments. Appendix Section A.1 provides further details. In the
remainder of the text, we refer to our adjusted data as model-consistent data.
Figure 2a shows our model-consistent measures of output (solid black line), consumption
(solid red line), and investment (dashed black line). In this and following figures, the data is
normalized to equal 100 in the starting period. Shaded areas indicate four important Swiss
recession episodes. The figure shows that per capita output remains roughly at 100 over
the sample considered (a consequence of our data treatment), while per capita consumption
and investment both have a downward trend. These observations imply that government
consumption and net exports have been growing over time—which can be mainly attributed
to growth in the trade balance. Another interesting observation in Figure 2a is the large
increase in per-capita investment at the end of the 1980s and subsequent sharp drop. At
the height of the investment boom, construction spending amounted to 13.4% of GDP
(approximately 5%-points above the values observed since 2000).
As to data on labor (hours per employee and the employment rate), obtaining series of
sufficient quality represents a key difficulty in any empirical work on Switzerland. Problems
surrounding the measurement of total hours have been highlighted in the discussion on
Switzerland’s comparatively low growth observed after 1970. For instance, Siegenthaler
(2015) raises the concern that prior to 1991, the OECD series on hours worked per employee
do not take absences from work and paid vacation into account. Exploiting available historical
(GCF) as a measure of investment. We use gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) instead because, in Swiss
data, all estimation errors are included to inventory changes, causing GCF to be excessively volatile.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics (1980Q1–2016Q3)
Dt σ(Dt)/σ(yt) Corr(Dt+k, yt)
k=-2 k=-1 k=0 k= 1 k=2
ct 0.60 0.44 0.52 0.55 0.44 0.33
xt 2.47 0.66 0.75 0.80 0.73 0.57
gt (incl. nxt) 3.53 0.12 0.30 0.44 0.44 0.39
ht 0.61 0.51 0.68 0.81 0.86 0.82
Note: Model-consistent data, HP-filtered with λ = 1600.
data on the different components of total hours worked, Siegenthaler (2015) establishes a
consistent annual time series of total hours worked for Switzerland covering the 1950–2010
period. In this work, we use a similarly constructed (unpublished) quarterly data series by
the Swiss National Bank.8 The OECD and SNB series are depicted in Figure 2b. In the
figure, the data is measured as a percentage of productive time (assumed at 1300 hours per
quarter). The visual comparison of the SNB (solid black line) and OECD (dashed black line)
series shows substantial discrepancies, especially prior to 1991. Compared to the SNB series,
the OECD series overstates growth in aggregate hours worked during the 1980s.
Table 1 summarizes basic descriptive statistics of the cyclical components of our model-
consistent data, namely the relative volatility of the series compared to output as well as the
cross-correlation patterns of each series with output. What stands out is the large volatility
of government consumption compared to output. This high volatility is explained by both,
large volatility in the trade balance, as well as the fact that this measure encompasses all
statistical errors of the quarterly measurement of GDP.
2.3.2 Parametrization and calibration
There are 7 model parameters: the capital share α, the discount factor β, the growth rate
of technology γz, the growth rate of population γn, the depreciation rate δ, the inverse
Frisch elasticity of labor ν, and the time allocation parameter ψ. Five parameters are set
according to Swiss data: We compute capital and labor shares from quarterly Swiss data
based on the income approach and obtain an α of 0.32.9 β is set to 0.9926, which implies
an annual riskless rate of 3%.10 γz and γn are estimated as least square trends from our
model-consistent data, with technology growing 1.10% and population growing by 0.70% per
year. The time allocation parameter ψ is set to 9.51, implying a steady state labor wedge of
roughly 40%, which is the double of the wedge implied by effective taxes. For the remaining
two parameters, data of sufficient quality is not available. We follow Brinca et al. (2016)
and set δ such that an annual deprecation rate of 5% is implied. We set the inverse Frisch
elasticity of labor ν to 1 in our baseline calibration—but the parameter is subject to several
8We wish to thank Christian Hepenstrick for kindly making this data available to us.
9More specifically, we attribute compensation of employees to labor income. Consumption of fixed
capital, production charges, and import charges are attributed to capital income. We leave the remainder
as ambiguous. The labor share is then obtained as unambiguous labor income divided by GDP net of the
ambiguous categories. As earlier data is not available, these computations are based on the 1990–2016 period.
10If tax-free riskless bonds are introduced to the prototype, the ensuing riskless rate is in line with average
real yields on 1-year Swiss confederation bonds between 1989 and 2007.
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robustness exercises given the controversy over its correct size.
2.3.3 Estimation of the Wedges
It follows from equations (2.8), (2.9) and (2.11) that three wedges (namely the efficiency,
labor and government expenditure wedges) can be directly measured from the data. By
contrast, recovering the investment wedge requires estimating the model’s decision rules,
as its expression in (2.10) involves expectations. The solution hence depends on the exact
specification of the model’s underlying stochastic process.
We follow Chari et al. (2007) and assume that the wedges are driven by an exogenous
four-dimensional random variable, which is called the state st and has probability πt(st).
The state st is the history of all underlying events st. The state st is assumed to follow a
Markov process of the form π(st|st−1). The mapping between the wedges and the event
st = (sA,t, sg,t, sl,t, sx,t) is one-to-one and onto, so without loss of generality we have
sA,t = logAt, sg,t = log gt, sl,t = 1− τl,t and sx,t = (1 + τx,t)−1. We uncover the state in
two steps. First, we use a maximum likelihood procedure to estimate the parameters of the
Markov process π(st|st−1). Second, we use the parameters to uncover the realized events st.
As to our first step—the estimation of parameters—we specify a VAR(1) process for the
events st, namely
st+1 = P0 + Pst + εt+1, εt+1 ∼ N(0,QQ′) (2.12)
where the shock term εt+1 is iid and normally distributed with mean zero and covariance
matrix QQ′. We then take a linear approximation of our model around the steady state to
obtain linear decision rules and solve the linear model to obtain a state-space representation
of the joint dynamics of the aggregates with Klein’s (2000) method. As in Chari et al. (2007),
we use the steady state Kalman filter to compute the likelihood function of our model for a
given set of parameters. Maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters P0, P , and Q are
then obtained based on the unconstrained maximization algorithm of Chari et al. (2007).
As to our second step—the measurement of realized wedges—the decision rules of our
linearized model are transformed such that we can uncover the realized events st from the
data on output, consumption, investment, and total hours. The capital stock is recovered
by the perpetual inventory method, based on the assumption that it is in steady state in
1980Q1.
2.4 The accounting procedure
The goal of the accounting step is to isolate the marginal effect of each wedge on the aggregate
variables through counterfactual experiments. To give an illustrative example, the following
explains how we obtain the marginal effect of the labor wedge on output. The first step is
to build a counterfactual economy, referred to as the labor-wedge-alone economy. It reflects
a variant of the prototype in which only the labor wedge varies over time, while all other
wedges are fixed at their steady-state values. The underlying state st in this economy is
the same as in the prototype economy. Importantly, the mapping between the efficiency,
investment, and government expenditure wedges to the state st is set to constants. This is
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key: because the different states st and hence wedges are correlated both contemporaneously
and across time, we need to keep the same underlying state st to ensure that expected future
realizations of the labor wedge remain the same as in the prototype economy. The next step
is to feed the initial capital stock and identified series of events st into the labor-wedge-alone
model to generate a counterfactual output series, called the labor component of output. Now,
we obtain the marginal effect of the labor wedge as the difference between actual output and
the labor component of output.
For the assessment of different narratives in Section 3.3, we are interested in the marginal
effect of, say, effective taxes on output. To compute this effect, we apply the logic of the
accounting procedure described above. First, we use data on effective taxes to compute
the tax-induced wedges—i.e. the counterfactual paths of the wedges that result because of
effective taxes only. Second, we compute the counterfactual path of output by feeding the
tax induced wedges in the corresponding wedges alone economy.11
3 Results
We now describe our quantitative results of applying the BCA procedure to Swiss cyclical
fluctuations, starting with a description of the wedges over the entire 1980–2016 period. We
then focus on their role for our target period 1987–1997 and use these results together with
additional evidence to assess the different hypotheses of the stagnation. Results for other
values of the Frisch elasticity ν are discussed in Apendix Section A.4 and look similar.
3.1 Properties of the wedges over the 1980–2016 period
Figure 3 shows the evolution of the wedges over our full sample (1980Q1–2016Q3), which
allows for a better perspective of the 1990s recession within the context of Swiss business
1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
70
80
90
100
110
Output At (1-τl,t) (1+τx,t)
-1
Figure 3: Output and wedges (1980Q1–2016Q3)
11To give an example, consider the marginal effect of payroll taxes on output. In our model, payroll taxes
only affect the labor wedge. We hence start with computing the payroll-tax-induced labor wedge. We then
feed the payroll-tax-induced labor wedge to the labor-wedge-alone economy to compute a counterfactual path
of output. The marginal effect of payroll taxes then corresponds to the difference between actual output and
the estimated payroll-component of output.
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Table 2: Wedge properties (1980Q1–2016Q3)
Wt
σ(Wt)
σ(Yt)
Corr(Wt+k,Yt) Corr(Wt+k,Xt) Corr(Wt+k,Ht)
k=-1 k=0 k=1 k=-1 k=0 k=1 k=-1 k=0 k=1
Efficiency wedge 0.71 0.87 0.93 0.73 0.66 0.67 0.56 0.67 0.54 0.38
Government wedge 3.53 0.30 0.44 0.44 -0.04 -0.09 0.03 0.21 0.23 0.21
Labor wedge 0.78 0.35 0.45 0.57 0.30 0.39 0.54 0.64 0.78 0.77
Investment wedge 0.58 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.68 0.83 0.75 0.65 0.66 0.60
Note: Data is HP-filtered with λ = 1600.
cycles. More precisely, the figure shows the evolution of detrended output (solid black line)
along with the evolution of the efficiency wedge (dashed black), labor wedge (dashed red),
and investment wedge (dotted red). The figure shows that the underlying distortions revealed
by the three wedges have different patterns. Over the entire sample, the figure depicts
structurally worsening labor and investment wedges and a structurally improving efficiency
wedge. Another notable thing is the relatively strong comovement between the efficiency
wedge and output. The figure also depicts a positive comovement between output and both
the investment wedge and the labor wedge. Further, the labor wedge appears to lag output
by a few quarters. Taking a closer look at the highlighted recession episodes shows that they
are all associated with a worsening of both the efficiency and the investment wedge. The
labor wedge worsens in the 1981, 1990, and 2001 recession, while the 2007 recession coincides
with an improvement in the labor wedge. The worsening of labor and investment wedges
appears considerably larger in the 1990s recession than in any other experienced recession
since the 1980s.
Table 2 summarizes the standard deviation of the wedges relative to output (Yt) as well
as correlations of the wedges with our model-consistent measures of output, investment (Xt),
and total hours (Ht). Data is HP-filtered. Analog to the plot, the table shows a strong
contemporaneous comovement between the efficiency wedge and output. It also reveals a
strong comovement between the investment wedge and investment as well as between the
labor wedge and total hours. As to the standard deviations to output, a finding that stands
out is the high volatility of the government wedge. The high volatility can be explained
by two factors. First, it is driven by net exports, which in our closed-economy model are
added to government consumption. Second, it is also due to the fact that our measure of
government expenditures includes all statistical errors made in the estimation of quarterly
GDP.
3.2 Role of the wedges in the 1990s
In the following, we take a closer look at the role of the efficiency, labor, and investment
wedges for our target period, focusing separately on the build-up and burst of the bubble
(1987Q1–1992Q4, with turning point in 1990Q2) and the ensuing stagnation (1993Q1–1997Q4).
Our computations are based on the assumption that the capital stock is in steady state
in 1987Q1. Figures 4 and 5 summarize our results. In both figures, panel a summarizes
the evolution of output (solid black line) together with the model predictions of output if
10
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Figure 4: 1987Q1–1993Q1
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Figure 5: 1993Q1–1999Q1
only one wedge is allowed to fluctuate, namely an efficiency-wedge-alone component (dashed
black), labor-wedge-alone component (dashed red), and investment-wedge-alone component
(dotted red). Panels b and c repeat the same exercise for investment and aggregate hours,
respectively. The way to read the plots is that—focusing for instance on panels a—the closer
a counterfactual experiment is to actual output (the solid black line), the more important
that specific wedge is in the evolution of output. The distance between actual output with
each of the different counterfactual lines represents the contribution of the remaining wedges
to the evolution of output.
Overall, the figures show that detrended output increased starkly between 1987Q1–1990Q2,
fell starkly between 1990Q3–1992Q4, and stagnated between 1993Q1–1997Q4. The pattern
in detrended investment and aggregate hours is roughly similar. According to Figure 4a, the
large increase in output in the 1987–1990 period can be almost entirely attributed to an
improvement in the efficiency wedge. Panels b and c of Figure 4 show that this improvement
in the efficiency wedge is also the main driver of the observed boom in investment and
increase in total hours worked. Continuing on Figure 4, the picture of the recession phase
appears similar: again it is largely the efficiency wedge that explains the observed output
movements, at least at the beginning of the recession. Starting around 1991, the deterioration
in the labor and investment wedges lead to a deepening of the recession. In 1991 and 1992,
the worsening of labor and investment wedges explains roughly half of the observed output
decline.
As to the stagnation phase, Figure 5 shows that while the efficiency wedge develops
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Table 3: Decomposition of real output movements (1987Q1–1997Q4)
Output components:
Episode Output growth efficiency government labor investment trend
Full episode: 10.5 5.3 3.0 -4.9 -4.6 11.7
Episode specific:
1987Q1–1990Q2 10.3 6.8 0.7 -0.8 0.2 3.5
1990Q3–1992Q4 -3.9 -4.6 1.4 -1.1 -2.1 2.4
1993Q1–1997Q4 4.7 4.0 0.7 -2.8 -2.4 5.2
Annualized:
1987Q1–1990Q2 3.0 2.0 0.2 -0.2 0.1 1.0
1990Q3–1992Q4 -1.5 -1.8 0.6 -0.4 -0.8 1.0
1993Q1–1997Q4 0.9 0.8 0.1 -0.6 -0.5 1.0
Note: Numbers in percent. Output growth measured in real per capita terms.
roughly in step with output, the efficiency wedge is no longer the dominant driver. Instead,
the sluggish development observed over the 1993Q1–1997Q4 episode is largely driven by a
deterioration in both the investment and labor wedge. The deterioration in these two wedges
also acts as a main driver of the evolution of investment. As to aggregate hours, Figure 5c
shows that the identified labor wedge closely tracks the evolution of aggregate hours.
The results in Figures 4 and 5 are depicted in terms of model-consistent (hence detrended)
data. For the three episodes of interest, the first block of Table 3 reports output growth in
real per capita terms—that is, now including the trend component. For each episode, the
table reports two different values: the numbers in the first block correspond to growth rates
over the entire episode studied. For better comparability across episodes, numbers in the
second block are annualized. The table highlights the same striking features discussed for
the figures, namely that the build-up, recession, and stagnation appear to have different
causes. The boom preceding the recession as well as the recession itself are largely driven
by the efficiency wedge, while a deterioration in the labor and investment wedges plays an
important role for the sluggish recovery. In addition to the information contained in the
figures, Table 3 also depicts results for the role played by the government wedge. In all
episodes of interest, it adds positively to output growth. However, the government wedge
does not play a dominant role for the evolution of output at any time.
3.3 Assessing the explanations of the 1990s stagnation
The accounting results discussed above give us measures of the role of each wedge in
specific episodes. In the following, we use these quantitative results together with additional
evidence to assess the different hypotheses of the 1990s stagnation. Importantly, although
our decomposition allows for a causal assessment of the wedges, evaluating different theories
is a more delicate endeavor. The main difficulty is that there is in principle no unique way of
relating the distinct narratives of the 1990s stagnation with detailed models. Our strategy in
the following is to turn to prominent theoretical mappings from the literature. This allows
to assess—from the viewpoint of our model and the chosen theoretical mapping—which
explanations are promising quantitatively.
Our analysis focuses on the most common explanations of the stagnation. As mentioned,
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at the time, the policy discussion on the causes of the stagnation evolved primarily around a
slowdown in productivity growth. Of particular concern was a lack of competition in sheltered
domestically-oriented sectors (e.g. telecommunications, agriculture, or construction), viewed
as an important impediment to productivity growth.12 More recent explanations of the
1990s stagnation tend to put more emphasis on episode-specific factors. These include a
deterioration in terms of trade, associated with a restrictive monetary policy made necessary
by high inflation at the end of the 1980s; the bursting of the housing bubble in the early 1990s
which exacerbated financial frictions throughout the 1990s; and a (pro-cyclical) increase
in fees and social security payments discouraging work (Dreher & Sturm, 2005; Ettlin &
Gaillard, 2001; Kleinewefers Lehner, 2007; Kohli, 2005).
3.3.1 Taxes
We start with assessing to what extent the deteriorating labor and investment wedges over
the 1992–1996 period are tax-induced. That is, we are interested to what extent the two
wedges—measured as implicit taxes on labor income and investment expenditures—reflect
explicit taxes levied by national and local authorities. To do so, we introduce four explicit tax
rates into the baseline model of Section 2.1 and derive the mapping to our standard wedges.
Namely, the taxes are the marginal tax rate on labor income τ̃l, the average consumption tax
rate τ̃c, the average tax rate on investment expenditures τ̃x, and the marginal tax rate on
capital income τ̃k. The only change to our prototype is in the household’s budget constraint.
Assuming all tax revenues are transferred back to the household via transfers Ω̈t, it now
writes:
(1 + τ̃c,t)c̈t + (1 + τ̃x,t)ẍt ≤ (1− τ̃l,t)ẅtlt + (1− τ̃k,t)rtk̈t + Ω̈t. (3.1)
Based on (3.1), we can solve for a tax-corrected expression of the labor wedge L̃W t. Note
that in the following, we abbreviate the labor wedge with LWt (instead of the previously
used 1− τl,t) to avoid any confusion with actual taxes levied. We receive:13
ψlνt = L̃W t
(1− τ̃l,t)
(1 + τ̃c,t)
(1− α) yt
ctlt
. (3.2)
As to the investment wedge, it is not possible based on (3.1) to obtain a formal mapping
between the standard investment wedge and the tax-corrected investment wedge. As an
approximation, we compare the wedge between the Euler equation’s left- and right-hand side
under certainty equivalence of (1) our standard model and (2) a model including measured
taxes as specified in (3.1). We refer to the object as Euler equation wedge EWt and compare
12This focus is well-documented by Lipp (2012), who provides a detailed analysis of the economic policy
of the Swiss government over the 1970–2000 period. It is also reflected in the policy measures implemented,
which focused on increasing competitiveness by increasing competition. Prominent examples include the
accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 or the implementation of a federal law on cartels
in 1995. Also illustrative for this overall policy focus are two prominent white papers in the 1990s calling
for more deregulation and competition, namely Hauser, Schwarz, and Vallender (1991) and (written in
reaffirmation of the former) Pury, Hauser, and Schmid (1995). Baltensperger (2005) offers an evaluation of
the white papers’ claims and their implementation.
13Comparing the tax-corrected measure L̃W t with the previously obtained labor wedge LWt (equation
(2.9)) shows that part of LWt indeed represents explicit taxes levied, as LWt =
1−τ̃l,t
1+τ̃c,t
L̃W t.
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Figure 6: The role of taxes (1987Q1–1999Q4)
the following two expressions:
ct+1
ct
= EWtβ(1 + γ)
(
α
yt+1
kt+1
+ (1− δ)
)
, (3.3)
ct+1
ct
= ẼW t
β(1 + γ)
(1 + τx̃,t)
(
(1− τ̃k,t+1)α
yt+1
kt+1
+ (1 + τ̃x,t+1)(1− δ)
)
. (3.4)
Tax data is obtained from McDaniel (2007). Her data base covers average Swiss tax
rates on consumption, investment, labor, and capital over the 1950–2012 period. We linearly
interpolate to the quarterly frequency. To obtain marginal labor income and capital income
tax rates, we multiply (respectively) average labor income and capital income tax rates
by 1.6.14 The number 1.6 has a different background in both instances. For labor income
taxes, it is obtained from a comparison of the ratio between Swiss average and marginal tax
rates.15 For capital income taxes, we were not able to obtain Swiss data of sufficient quality,
and the 1.6 stems from a comparison of US average and marginal capital income tax rates
based on McDaniel (2007) and Mendoza, Razin, and Tesar (1994). The data is depicted in
Figure 9 in Appendix Section A.2. The figure shows an increase in all four tax series over the
1980–2012 sample, in line with the fall in labor and investment wedges depicted in Figure 3.
Interestingly, when focusing more closely on the 1991–1996 period (the period for which we
seek an explanation of the deteriorating labor and investment wedge), mainly movements in
labor income taxes stand out. For the other taxes, most of the increase occurs after 1996.
Figure 6 summarizes the results of our tax decomposition for the 1987Q1–1999Q4 period.
The first figure shows the labor wedge LWt (in solid black) together with the tax-corrected
labor wedge L̃W t (dotted black). The second figure shows the Euler wedge EWt (solid
black) together with the tax-corrected Euler wedge ẼW t (dotted black). In both cases,
the difference between the two lines represents the contribution of taxes. Focusing first on
Figure 6a, the figure shows that roughly 70% of the observed decline in the labor wedge can
be explained by an increase in labor income taxes.16 For the 1992Q1–1996Q4 period, the
14We use a constant conversion rate of 1.6 as a rough approximation. This approximation is sufficient for
our purposes as our quantitative results are not sensitive to the exact factor chosen.
15In particular, we consider the effective (total) income tax-schedule at the median income in the four
biggest cantons for selected years.
16We only refer to labor income taxes (without consumption taxes) as variation in consumption taxes
play almost no role for our results in Figure 6a.
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evolution of taxes accounts for approximately 50% of the deterioration in the labor wedge.
To further assess the quantitative importance of these tax changes for output growth, we
run a counterfactual assuming the evolution of the labor wedge corresponds to L̃W t (and
all other wedges and expectations thereof are unchanged, as briefly outlined in Section 2.4).
Results in terms of our model-consistent data are depicted in Figure 6c. Holding labor taxes
constant, we estimate a total real per capita output growth between 1992Q1–1996Q4 of
1.8%—which is 2.8%-points above the observed growth of -1%. Our results support the view
that an increase in fees and social security payments in the 1990s has been an important
contributing factor to the 1990s stagnation, an argument e.g. brought forward by Kohli
(2005) or Ettlin and Gaillard (2001). Also note that the increase in payroll taxes went along
with an extension in unemployment benefits which potentially explains an even further share
of the observed labor wedge decline—but here we are left speculating.17
Turning to Figure 6b, the fact that the two lines are merely distinguishable implies that
the measured taxes have a negligible impact for the development of the Euler wedge. Stated
differently, according to our tax decomposition, changes in effective investment and capital
income taxes cannot account for the observed increase in investment costs in the 1990s.
3.3.2 The role of investment frictions
We now explore the role of investment frictions in the stagnation phase. Similar to our tax
assessment, this requires explicitly stating a mapping between a measure of financial frictions
and our prototype wedges introduced in Section 2.2. But while taxes readily translate into
the budget constraint of our prototype, the difficulty in assessing investment frictions is that
there is more leeway in modeling choices. The following assessment is based on a prominent
neoclassical model with costly state verification in the spirit of Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997).18
The model specifies a mapping between the lending-deposit spread—which is standardly
viewed as an indicator of financial frictions—and the investment wedge. A full overview of
the model equations is contained in Appendix Section A.3. In a nutshell, the key difference to
our prototype is that now agency problems between borrowers and lenders generate a spread
between the return on investment and the savings rate. Based on this set-up, we obtain an
expression of the investment wedge IWt as a function of the lending-deposit spread sprt,
monitoring costs µ, and the distribution of the idiosyncratic risk component of investment
projects F (ω), IW (sprt;µ,F (ω)). The financial-frictions-corrected investment wedge ĨW t
can then be obtained as:
ĨW t =
IWt
IW (sprt;µ,F (ω))
. (3.5)
Data on the deposit-lending spread is depicted in Figure 7a.19 The evolution of the spread
17See for instance Steiger (2007) for a detailed account on the labor market policy changes in the 1990s.
According to Steiger (2007), employees’ contribution rate to the unemployment system increased from 0.4 to
2% of wages in 1993 and to 3% of wages in 1995. Also, the duration of unemployment benefit entitlement
and replacement rates (how much of the pre-unemployment wage is paid as unemployment benefits) were
raised in several steps between 1992 and 2004.
18See Lu (2013) for an alternative mapping between lending-deposit spreads and the investment wedge.
We prefer Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) as it allows to map the investment wedge IWt rather than the Euler
equation wedge EWt introduced in Section 3.3.1.
19Data is obtained from the IMF International Financial Statistics. Lending rates are average rates
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Figure 7: Assessing the role of disruptions in financial intermediation (1987Q1–1999Q4)
indicates an easing of frictions between 1987 and 1992 and subsequent sharp increase. To
obtain the financial-friction-adjusted investment wedge ĨW t from this spread data, we also
need to specify the size of monitoring costs µ and the distribution of the idiosyncratic risk
component of investment projects F (ω). We follow Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997) suggestions
to work with a range of 0.20 to 0.36 and set µ = 0.25. ω is assumed to follow a log-normal
distribution with standard deviation σω = 0.207 and unity mean (µω = −σ
2
ω
2 ).
20 Alternative
calibrations are considered in Appendix Section A.4.
Figures 7b and 7c show our results. In 7b, the difference between the financial-friction-
corrected investment wedge ĨW t (black dashed line) and standard investment wedge IWt
(solid black line) gives the contribution of financial frictions. The figure shows that financial
frictions have played an unequal role over the 1987Q1–1999Q4 period. In the boom phase up
until 1992, a decrease in financial frictions has played a positive role for output, decreasing
the cost of investment. The opposite holds after 1992: the increase in financial frictions over
the 1992Q1–1996Q4 period explains the entire deterioration of the investment wedge. More
precisely, holding financial frictions constant, we obtain a 2% increase in the investment wedge,
compared to the actual deterioration of over 6%. To assess the quantitative importance of
the identified frictions for output, Figure 7c shows results of a counterfactual exercise which
sets the investment wedge to ĨW t (with results depicted in terms of model-consistent data).
Over the entire episode, the role of financial frictions is ambiguous. For 1992Q1–1996Q4
more specifically, holding financial frictions constant and adding trend growth, we obtain a
real per capita output growth of 4%. For comparison, actual per capita growth was -1%.
3.3.3 Net exports and lack of competitiveness
Two hypotheses can directly be evaluated with our business cycle accounting results reported
in Section 3.2, namely the role played by a depression in net exports and by productivity
growth stagnation. Through the lens of our model, net exports have not played an important
role for the observed growth stagnation. The result follows from the wedge decomposition
presented in Table 3: Net exports are contained in the government wedge, which according
to our results has positively added to output growth in the boom, recession, and stagnation
by Cantonal banks on first mortgages with variable interest rates. Deposit rates refer to average rates on
three-month deposits with large banks.
20In the model, monitoring costs are expressed as the share of inputs used for investment projects.
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Figure 8: Productivity and utilization-adjusted productivity
studied. Of course, this does not exclude that output growth has been depressed by an
expensive Swiss franc. Our main point is that—from the viewpoint of our model—net exports
were not a main deterrence to growth.
As to productivity growth stagnation, our results are similar: According to Figure 5, the
development of the efficiency wedge cannot account for the stagnation phase. The efficiency
wedge enters the model equations as a measure of total factor productivity (TFP) or Solow
residual. It is meant to capture the effects of technological and institutional changes and is
standardly thought to increase with improved technology, improved competition, or better
institutions. According to our results, there is no evidence that TFP fell during the stagnation
phase. It remained more or less constant between 1993 and 1996 and then increased by
roughly 3% until 1997Q4. Again, this is not to say that policies to increase competitiveness
were unsuccessful or unnecessary. In fact, our results imply that productivity growth after
1996 acted as a main driver of output growth (e.g. Figure 3). However, Table 3 shows that
in the stagnation phase, the efficiency wedge has positively added to growth. Output growth
has been mainly deterred by a worsening of the labor and investment wedges, i.e. factors
that acted like a tax increase on labor and investment.
It has to be kept in mind that the efficiency wedge is an imprecise measure of techno-
logical change. It is obtained as the deviation of measured input and output and hence
also incorporates any mismeasurement thereof. Mismeasurement could stem from concep-
tual shortcomings in the compilation of the data, e.g. in the sense highlighted by Kohli
(2004) or Siegenthaler (2015).21 Another source of mismeasurements are misconceptions in
the specification of the production function. A prominent example is the omission of an
intensive margin of capital adjustment, as e.g. put forward by Basu, Fernald, and Kimball
(2006). Omitting variation in capital utilization ut directly translates into mismeasured
variations in the efficiency wedge. Assuming utilization enters the production function as
yt = Ãt(ktut)αl
1−α
t implies that the efficiency wedge At uncovered using (2.8) is mis-specified
by the factor uαt . Taking the new specification at face value and denoting with Ãt the true
and with At the previously measured efficiency wedge, we have that Ãt = At/uαt . Figure 8
shows the implications of this correction, based on utilization data from the KOF Quarterly
Industry Survey. The figure further emphasizes our main point that, through the lens of our
21Using the best available data series, we cannot take a quantitative stand on this issue.
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model, a productivity slow-down cannot be viewed as the causing factor of 1990s stagnation.
4 Concluding remarks
We examine the causes of the Swiss stagnation of the 1990s through the lens of the business
cycle accounting framework of Chari et al. (2007). In contrast to the dominant view, we find
that neither a slowdown in productivity growth nor a depression in net exports can account
for the stagnation. Instead, we find that an increase in income taxes and financial frictions
can explain the stagnation. From the perspective of our model, these factors act like a tax
increase on labor and investment. Holding income taxes and financial frictions constant,
counterfactual real annual output growth is 1.93% for the years 1992–1996, compared to the
observed annual growth of 0.35%.
As to directions for further work, an interesting topic not addressed in this paper is the
role played by migration. In the 1970s and 1980s, seasonal workers increased the labor force
in booms, without burdening the unemployment system in downturns (see de Wild (2010)).
This mechanism changed in the 1990s due to an unprecedented increase in the number of
permanent residents, with interesting consequences for business cycle dynamics.
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A Appendix
A.1 Defining consistent measurements
The following provides details on the adjustments to the SECO series on output, consumption,
and investment that are needed to make the data consistent with the structure of our model
economy. Following Brinca et al. (2016) and Cooley (1995), the data is adjusted in the
following way:
(1) To account for working with a closed economy, we include net exports to government
consumption. A modeling justification is provided by Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan
(2005), who show equivalence results between (1) the equilibrium conditions of a small
open economy and (2) a closed-economy model that includes net exports to government
consumption.
(2) We adjust nominal GDP and its components for sales taxes. Data on the share of
taxes on goods and services out of GDP (τt) is from the OECD. We linearly interpolate
the annual series to the quarterly frequency. We then assume that the sales taxes are
levied on consumption and imports, and hence subtract the respective tax shares from
our measures of Ct and Gt.
(3) We detrend the series by dividing them by three factors: (1) the implicit price deflator;
(2) quarterly population (obtained by interpolating the annual series using spline
methods); and (3) the rate of constant labor augmenting technological progress γ,
computed such that detrended output has mean zero over the sample period.
In principle, we would also want to correct for the (from a modeling perspective) inconsistent
treatment by national accounts of consumer durables as consumption rather than investment
expenditures. This also implies imputing an estimated flow of services from durables to
measured output and consumption. However, with the obtainable data, even a rough
classification of consumption expenditures into durables and non-durables is not possible. In
principle, the Swiss Federal Statistical Office collects annual data on individual consumption
according to purpose, following the classification of the United Nations Statistics Division
and Eurostat (so-called COICOP). However, the data is not publicly available, as only results
in terms of divisions (not groups) is reported.
A.2 Tax data
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Figure 9: Evolution of taxes (1980Q1–2012Q4)
A.3 Financial frictions model
We consider a neoclassical model with costly state verification along the lines of Carlstrom
and Fuerst (1997) and an exposition thereof in a working-paper version of Chari et al.
(2007). The economy is populated by a continuum of households of mass Pt, a continuum of
risk-neutral entrepreneurs of mass ηPt and a continuum of firms and financial intermediaries
21
of mass 1. The household objective function and per capita budget constraint write (using
whenever possible the same notation as introduced in Section 2.1):
max E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{[
log c̈t −ψ
l1+νt
1 + ν
]
Pt
}
,
s.t. c̈t + qt[
Pt+1k̈h,t+1
Pt
− (1− δ)k̈h,t] ≤ ẅtlt + rtk̈h,t + rdt [ẅtlt + rtk̈h,t − ηT̈ et − c̈t] + Ω̈t − ηT̈ et .
In the beginning of the period, households supply labor lt and capital k̈h,t to firms. After
receiving labor and capital income, households pay a transfer ηT̈ et to entrepreneurs and
purchase consumption goods c̈t. Households can store their remaining income (ẅtlt+ rtk̈h,t−
ηT̈ et − c̈t) at a bank for a risk-free deposit rate rdt . At the end of the period, the market for
capital operates. Using the gross-return on the saved funds and the lump-sum distributed
profits Ω̈t, households buy new capital k̈h,t+1 − (1− δ)k̈h,t at a price q̈t. Appendix Table 4
contains a more complete overview of the timing of events.
Firms combine capital of households K̈h,t, capital of entrepreneurs ηK̈e,t, and labor
supplied by households Lt to produce consumption goods Ÿt based on the technology
Ÿt = AtK̈αt (ZtLt)
1−α, where K̈t ≡ K̈h,t + ηK̈e,t. In terms of K̈t, the firm problem is
unchanged compared to our prototype of Section 2.1.
By comparison to our prototype, the two novel actors are entrepreneurs and financial
intermediaries. We jointly specify their problem, as it is closely related. Each entrepreneur j
transforms ïjt units of consumption goods into ω
j
t ï
j
t capital goods. ω is iid across entrepreneurs
and time, with density φ and c.d.f. Φ. To finance the investment ïjt , entrepreneurs use their
net worth äjt and loans obtained from financial intermediaries at the lending rate (1 + rk,tj).
Entrepreneur j’s net worth is composed of rental income on capital holdings, the transfer
from households and the value of un-depreciated capital, i.e. äjt = T̈ et + k̈
j
e,t[rt + qt(1− δ)].
The transfer T̈ et ensures that entrepreneurs which defaulted in the last period can continue
to operate.
Financial intermediaries channel funds from households to entrepreneurs. By providing
funds to infinitely many entrepreneurs, intermediaries are able to diversify entrepreneurs’
idiosyncratic risk and offer households a safe rate rdt on deposits. To introduce agency
problems, we assume that the realization of ω is private information to the entrepreneur. ω
can only be observed by the intermediary at cost µïjt . This asymmetric information set-up
creates a moral hazard problem as entrepreneurs have an incentive to misreport ωj in the
absence of monitoring. As in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), we assume that entrepreneurs
can only enter into within-period deterministic contracts that are agreed upon before ω
realizes. Townsend (1979) has shown that under such conditions, the optimal contract takes
the form of a risky debt contract. Entrepreneur j borrows ïjt − ä
j
t consumption goods and
agrees to repay (1 + rjk,t)(ï
j
t − ä
j
t ) capital goods. If entrepreneur j is not able to pay back,
i.e. if ωj ïjt < (1 + r
j
k,t)(ï
j
t − ä
j
t ) ≡ ω̄j ï
j
t , intermediaries monitor and seize all returns ωj ï
j
t
from the project. Under the contract scheme specified above, entrepreneurs’ and financial
intermediaries’ expected income writes, respectively:
qtï
j
t
[∫ ∞
ω̄t
(ωt − ω̄t)φ(ω)dω
]
≡ qtïjtf(ω̄t),
qtï
j
t
[
(1−Φ(ω̄t))ω̄t +
∫ ω̄t
0
(ωt − µ)φ(ω)dω
]
≡ qtïjtg(ω̄t).
All economic rents generated by the contract are assumed to flow to the entrepreneur. The
contract maximizing entrepreneurs’ expected income subject to the participation constraint
of financial intermediaries is given by the solution to the problem:
max
ïjt ,ω̄t
qtï
j
tf(ω̄t),
s.t. qtïjtg(ω̄t) ≥ (1 + r
d
t )(ï
j
t − ä
j
t ).
The assumption that all rents flow to entrepreneurs implies that in optimum, the lending
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rate is minimized, which is the case for rdt = 0. Combining the FOCs yields:
qtf(ω̄
j
t ) +
f ′(ω̄jt )
g′(ω̄jt )
[1− qtg(ω̄jt )] = 0, (A.1)
which implies the same ω̄t for all entrepreneurs, independent of the level of net worth. As
the participation constraint holds with equality (ïjt =
äjt
1−qtg(ω̄t) ), the expected income of an
entrepreneur with net worth äjt is equal to
qtï
j
tf(ω̄t) =
äjtqtf(ω̄t)
1− qtω̄t
. (A.2)
Since ïjt is linear in ä
j
t , both aggregate ït and aggregate income of entrepreneurs is linear
in aggregate net worth ät. Overall, the after capital production budget constraint of
entrepreneurs can be written as
c̈je,t + qt
Pt+1
Pt
k̈je,t+1 = ä
j
t
qtf(ω̄t)
1− qtω̄t
. (A.3)
Aggregating over all entrepreneurs, the aggregate law of motion of entrepreneurial capital
can be written as
c̈e,t + qt
Pt+1
Pt
k̈e,t+1 =
(
T̈ et + k̈e,t[rt + qt(1− δ)]
) qtf(ω̄t)
1− qtω̄t
. (A.4)
Finally, for completeness, we specify the entrepreneurs objective function, which is given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
(βγ))t c̈e,t,
with γ ∈ (0, 1). The assumption that entrepreneurs discount the future at a higher rate
than consumers is needed because the return on entrepreneurial savings is larger than
household savings. In the steady state, the return on household savings will be exactly
1/β. If entrepreneurs had the same discount rate as households, they would continue
accumulating capital until they are completely self-financed (ït = ät). Carlstrom and Fuerst
(1997) set 1/γ = qf(ω̄)/(1− qf(ω̄)), such that the steady state return on internal funds of
entrepreneurs is exactly equalized. Entrepreneurs maximize their objective subject to the
budget constraint given above.
To summarize the model, the list of general equilibrium equations is:
yt = Atk
α
t l
1−α
t , (A.5)
ψ (lt)
ν = (1− α)yt/ct
lt
, ⇒ (1− τl,t) = 1, (A.6)
qt
ct
= β(1 + γ)Et
[
1
ct+1
(
α
yt+1
kt+1
+ qt+1(1− δ)
)]
, (A.7)
(1 + γn)(1 + γ)kt+1 = (1− δ)kt + ηit[1−Φ(ωt)µ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡xt
, (A.8)
yt = ct + ηce,t + ηit. (A.9)
In (A.9), we use xt to denote the sum of all entrepreneurial investments net of the resources
spent for monitoring. The detailed model with investment frictions is equivalent to our
prototype model with the following investment and government expenditure wedge:
IWt = (1 + τx,t) = qt, (A.10)
gt = ηce,t + xt
Φ(ω̄t)µ
1−Φ(ω̄t)µ
. (A.11)
For our purposes, what matters is the mapping between the investment wedge IWt and
the lending-deposit spread qt(1+ rkt ). In particular, using the threshold definition for ω̄t and
the fact that the participation constraint of intermediaries holds with equality, we obtain the
following relationship between ω̄t and the interest spread qt(1 + rkt )/1:
qt(1 + rk) =
ω̄t
g(ω̄t)
. (A.12)
According to the model, qt(1 + rk) can never drop below 1 as households have always an
outside option with zero interest. We normalize the data accordingly. Conditions (A.1) and
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(A.12) define a theoretical mapping between the lending-deposit spread qt(1 + rkt ) and the
investment wedge IWt that only depends on the monitoring costs µ and the distribution
of ω,
qt = IW (qt(1 + rkt );µ,F (ω)). (A.13)
Table 4: The timing of events in a period
1. Aggregate shocks realize.
2. Households and entrepreneurs rent capital and labor to firms. Firms produce consumption
goods.
3. Households and entrepreneurs receive wage and capital rental payments.
Households transfer income to entrepreneurs.
4. Households consume part of their income and store the remainder either via bank deposits or
at home.
5. Firms use their net worth to obtain loans from financial intermediaries to finance their capital
creation projects.
6. The idiosyncratic productivity shock ω of each entrepreneur realizes. Entrepreneurs sell the
newly created capital at price qt and pay back their loans, or, if ω < ω̄t,
default and are monitored by the financial intermediaries.
7. Households obtain lump-sum transfers Ω̈t and the gross-return on deposits and buy
capital goods. The non-defaulting entrepreneurs make their consumption-saving decision.
A.4 Robustness
A.4.1 The role of the Frisch elasticity for the BCA exercise
In the following, we discuss the robustness of our main BCA results for alternative values of
the Frisch elasticity (ν = 0.5 and ν = 2).
Properties of the wedges over the 1980–2016 period. Figures 10 and 11 show the
evolution of detrended output (solid black line) along with the evolution of the efficiency
(dashed black), labor (dashed red), and investment (dotted red) wedge for the 1980Q1–2016Q3
period. Tables 5 and 6 summarize the standard deviation of the wedges relative to output
(Yt) and correlations of the wedges with our model-consistent measures of output, investment
(Xt) and total hours (Ht). The results show that changes in ν have a small impact on the
historical evolution of wedges and the wedges’ properties in terms of business cycle moments.
The main effect is on the properties of the identified labor wedge. The larger ν, the more
volatile is the identified labor wedge relative to output. Also, the identified labor wedge is
more strongly correlated with output, investment, and labor when the Frisch elasticity of
labor is lower (i.e. for larger ν). Overall, the properties of the identified wedges are broadly
similar for the different values of ν.
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Figure 10: Robustness: Output and wedges for ν = 0.5 (1980Q1–2016Q3)
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Figure 11: Robustness: Output and wedges for ν = 2 (1980Q1–2016Q3)
Table 5: Robustness: Wedge properties for ν = 0.5 (1980Q1–2016Q3)
Wt
σ(Wt)
σ(Yt)
Corr(Wt+k,Yt) Corr(Wt+k,Xt) Corr(Wt+k,Ht)
k=-1 k=0 k=1 k=-1 k=0 k=1 k=-1 k=0 k=1
Efficiency wedge 0.71 0.87 0.93 0.73 0.66 0.67 0.56 0.67 0.54 0.38
Government wedge 3.53 0.30 0.44 0.44 -0.04 -0.09 0.03 0.21 0.23 0.21
Labor wedge 0.59 0.14 0.20 0.32 0.10 0.16 0.32 0.40 0.55 0.57
Investment wedge 0.58 0.57 0.66 0.72 0.70 0.87 0.87 0.85 0.92 0.87
Note: Data is HP-filtered with λ = 1600.
Table 6: Robustness: Wedge properties for ν = 2 (1980Q1–2016Q3)
Wt
σ(Wt)
σ(Yt)
Corr(Wt+k,Yt) Corr(Wt+k,Xt) Corr(Wt+k,Ht)
k=-1 k=0 k=1 k=-1 k=0 k=1 k=-1 k=0 k=1
Efficiency wedge 0.71 0.87 0.93 0.73 0.66 0.67 0.56 0.67 0.54 0.38
Government wedge 3.53 0.30 0.44 0.44 -0.04 -0.09 0.03 0.21 0.23 0.21
Labor wedge 1.32 0.52 0.64 0.74 0.49 0.60 0.71 0.81 0.93 0.89
Investment wedge 0.57 0.57 0.61 0.62 0.74 0.88 0.83 0.79 0.82 0.75
Note: Data is HP-filtered with λ = 1600.
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Role of the wedges in the 1990s. Figures 12–15 summarize the role of the different
wedges for the build-up and burst of the bubble (1987Q1–1992Q4) and for the ensuing
stagnation (1993Q1–1997Q4) for different values of ν. In all figures, panel a summarizes
the evolution of output (solid black line) together with the model predictions of output if
only one wedge is allowed to fluctuate, namely an efficiency-wedge-alone component (dashed
black), labor-wedge-alone component (dashed red), and investment-wedge-alone component
(dotted red). Panels b and c repeat the same exercise for investment and aggregate hours,
respectively. According to the figures, the role of wedges does not change considerably for
either ν = 0.5 or ν = 2. In each case, (i) the efficiency wedge plays the dominant role for
the boom-phase in the 1987–1990 period and (ii) the worsening of the labor and investment
wedges contribute considerably to the downturn between 1991-1992 period and drive the
sluggish development between 1993Q1–1997Q4.
To quantify the role of wedges, Tables 7 and 8 report the contribution of the wedges to
output growth. The starkest differences are in the role of the labor wedge for the bust phase
and in the role of the investment wedge for the stagnation phase. The larger ν, the more
important is the labor wedge (and so the less important is the investment wedge). Overall,
the quantitative differences are moderate. Our results on the role of wedges for the 1990s
stagnation presented in the main body of the paper (Section 3.2) appear robust to changes in ν.
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Figure 12: Robustness: The 1987Q1–1993Q1 period for ν = 0.5
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Figure 13: Robustness: The 1993Q1–1999Q1 period for ν = 0.5
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Figure 14: Robustness: The 1987Q1–1993Q1 period for ν = 2
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Figure 15: Robustness: The 1993Q1–1999Q1 period for ν = 2
Table 7: Robustness: Decomposition of real output movements for ν = 0.5 (1987Q1–1997Q4)
Output components:
Episode Output growth efficiency government labor investment trend
Full episode: 10.5 5.2 4.3 -5.1 -5.5 11.7
Episode specific:
1987Q1–1990Q2 10.3 7.8 0.9 -3.2 1.2 3.5
1990Q3–1992Q4 -3.9 -5.8 1.9 0.3 -2.8 2.4
1993Q1–1997Q4 4.7 4.3 1.2 -2.4 -3.5 5.2
Annualized:
1987Q1–1990Q2 3.0 2.3 0.3 -0.9 0.4 1.0
1990Q3–1992Q4 -1.5 -2.3 0.8 0.1 -1.1 1.0
1993Q1–1997Q4 0.9 0.9 0.2 -0.5 -0.7 1.0
Note: Numbers in percent. Output growth measured in real per capita terms.
Table 8: Robustness: Decomposition of real output movements for ν = 2 (1987Q1–1997Q4)
Output components:
Episode Output growth efficiency government labor investment trend
Full episode: 10.5 4.7 2.5 -5.0 -3.4 11.7
Episode specific:
1987Q1–1990Q2 10.3 5.8 0.5 0.3 0.2 3.5
1990Q3–1992Q4 -3.9 -3.8 1.1 -2.2 -1.4 2.4
1993Q1–1997Q4 4.7 3.5 0.7 -2.7 -1.9 5.2
Annualized:
1987Q1–1990Q2 3.0 1.7 0.2 0.1 0.1 1.0
1990Q3–1992Q4 -1.5 -1.5 0.4 -0.9 -0.6 1.0
1993Q1–1997Q4 0.9 0.7 0.1 -0.5 -0.4 1.0
Note: Numbers in percent. Output growth measured in real per capita terms.
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Assessing the explanations: The role of taxes. Figures 16 and 17 repeat our
assessment of the role of taxes for the 1990s stagnation from Section 3.3.1 for two alternative
values of ν. Again, panels a show the labor wedge LWt (in solid black) together with the
tax-corrected labor wedge L̃W t (dotted black). Panels b show the Euler wedge EWt (solid
black) together with the tax-corrected Euler wedge ẼW t (dotted black). In both panels,
the difference between the two lines represents the contribution of taxes. Panels c depict
the counterfactual path of output when holding labor taxes fixed. Overall, our results show
that the value of ν matters for the quantitative assessment of the contribution of taxes.
For ν = 0.5, roughly 75% of the drop in the labor wedge between 1992Q1–1996Q4 can be
explained by changes in labor taxes, opposed to 28% for ν = 2. Holding labor taxes constant
and assuming ν = 0.5, we estimate a real per capita output growth between 1992Q1–1996Q4
of 0.12%, opposed to an actual real per capita output fall of 1%. For ν = 2, the same
counterfactual is 2.38%. While the quantitative results differ depending on the exact value
of the Frisch elasticity, they all point towards an important role played by changes in labor
taxes for the evolution of the labor wedge and output in the 1990s.
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Figure 16: Robustness: The role of taxes for ν = 0.5 (1987Q1–1999Q4)
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Figure 17: Robustness: The role of taxes for ν = 2 (1987Q1–1999Q4)
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Assessing the explanations: The role of investment frictions. Figures 18 and 19
repeat our assessment of the role of investment frictions from Section 3.3.2 for ν = 0.5 and
ν = 2. As in Figure 7, panels a depict the investment wedge IWt (in solid black) together
with the lending-deposit spread (dotted black). Panels b show the investment wedge IWt (in
solid black) together with the financial-friction-corrected labor wedge ĨW t (dotted black).
The difference between the two lines represents the contribution of investment frictions.
Panels c depict the counterfactual path of output when holding financial frictions constant.
According to our results, for both ν = 0.5 and ν = 2, changes in investment frictions can
explain the entire deterioration of the investment wedge. Further, the value of ν implies only
small differences for counterfactual output. Keeping financial frictions fixed and assuming
ν = 0.5, we obtain a real per capita output growth between 1992Q1–1996Q4 of 5.39%. For
ν = 2, the same number is 4.26%. Hence both qualitatively and quantitatively, the role of
investment frictions presented in Section 3.3.2 is robust to reasonable changes in ν.
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Figure 18: Robustness: The role of disruptions in financial intermediation for ν = 0.5
(1987Q1–1999Q4)
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Figure 19: Robustness: The role of disruptions in financial intermediation for ν = 2
(1987Q1–1999Q4)
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Assessing the explanations: Lack of competitiveness. Figures 20 and 21 depict
the evolution of the efficiency wedge and the utilization-adjusted efficiency wedge for the cal-
ibration with ν = 0.5 and ν = 2. We find no large differences. As concluded in Section 3.3.3,
we find no evidence for a productivity growth slowdown during the stagnation phase.
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Figure 20: Robustness: Productivity and utilization-adjusted productivity for ν = 0.5
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Figure 21: Robustness: Productivity and utilization-adjusted productivity for ν = 2
A.4.2 Robustness of the investment wedge to lending-deposit spread relation
In the following, we repeat our assessment of the role of investment frictions from Section 3.3.2
for alternative calibrations of the two parameters pertaining to the model’s financial market.
We choose alternative values for monitoring costs (µ = 0.2, 0.36) and for the standard
deviation of the idiosyncratic risk component of investment projects (σω = 0.1, 0.3) within
the range considered as reasonable by Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997). Figures 22–25 depict the
results. In particular, panels a show the investment wedge IWt (in solid black) together with
the lending-deposit spread (dotted black). Panels b depict the investment wedge IWt (in solid
black) together with the financial-friction-corrected labor wedge ĨW t (dotted black). In both
panels, the difference between the two lines represents the contribution of investment frictions.
Panels c depict the counterfactual path of output when holding financial frictions constant.
In all cases, investment frictions can explain the entire deterioration of the investment wedge
between 1992Q1–1996Q4. Also, there are no major differences in the counterfactual real
per capita output growth. Holding financial frictions constant and assuming either µ = 0.2,
µ = 0.36, σω = 0.1, or σω = 0.3, we obtain a real per capita output growth between
1992Q1–1996Q4 of 3.40%, 5.25%, 4.37%, or 3.04%. Overall, the role of investment frictions
is very similar among all different calibrations.
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Figure 22: Robustness: The role of disruptions in financial intermediation for µ = 0.20
(1987Q1–1999Q4)
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Figure 23: Robustness: The role of disruptions in financial intermediation for µ = 0.36
(1987Q1–1999Q4)
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Figure 24: Robustness: The role of disruptions in financial intermediation for σω = 0.10
(1987Q1–1999Q4)
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Figure 25: Robustness: The role of disruptions in financial intermediation for σω = 0.30
(1987Q1–1999Q4)
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